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Abstract: The conflict between Ukrainians and Poles in the period of the Second 
World War, known to the general public as „Volhynia tragedy/massacre”, is one of the most 
problematic and hotly debated issues of the common Polish-Ukrainian history. In recent 
years there have been a lot of controversial interpretations regarding the assessment of the 
causes and development of the conflict in Volhynia in 1943-1944, and especially the number 
of causalities of the conflict on both sides, including different approaches to presentation of 
the common history events. The problem in question has become the subject of political 
speculations, negatively affecting the inter-state relations, in general. The search for the 
ways to transform the historical memory of Ukrainians and Poles and to eliminate 
interethnic confrontations implies the multifaceted, unbiased elucidation of all aspects of the 
problem and surmounting the negative socio-historical stereotypes that occur in both 
societies. 
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Rezumat: Confruntarea ucraineano-poloneză din Volhynia în al Doilea Război 
Mondial: transformările memoriei istorice. Conflictul dintre ucraineni și polonezi în 
perioada celui de-al doilea război mondial, cunoscut de publicul larg drept „tragedia / 
masacrul din Volhynia”, reprezintă unul dintre aspectele cele mai problematice și mai 
dezbătute ale istoriei comune polono-ucrainene. În ultimii ani au existat numeroase 
interpretări controversate referitoare la evaluarea cauzelor și a dezvoltării conflictului din 
Volhynia în 1943-1944 și, în special, cu privire la numărul victimelor acestuia din ambele 
tabere, inclusiv abordări diferite ale prezentării evenimentelor istorice comune. Problema în 
cauză a devenit obiectul unor speculații politice, afectând negativ relațiile interstatale, în 
general. Căutarea modalităților de transformare a memoriei istorice a ucrainenilor și a 
polonezilor și de eliminare a tensiunilor interetnice implică elucidarea multiplă și imparțială 
146  Liudmyla Strilchuk 
a tuturor aspectelor problemei și depășirea stereotipurilor socio-istorice negative care apar 
în ambele societăți. 
 
Résumé: La confrontation ukrainien-polonais de Volhynia pendant la Seconde 
Guerre Mondiale: les transformations de la mémoire historique. Le conflit entre les 
Ukrainiens et les Polonais de la période de la seconde guerre mondiale, connu par le public 
comme «la tragédie/le massacre de Volhynia» représente un des aspects les plus 
problématiques et plus discutés de l’histoire commune polonaise-ukrainienne. Les dernières 
années, il y a eu de nombreuses interprétations controversées concernant l’évaluation des 
causes et du développement du conflit de Volhynia en 1943-1944 et, spécialement, au numéro 
des victimes de celui-ci des deux camps, y inclus des abords différents de la présentation des 
événements historiques communs. La question en cause devint l’objet des spéculations 
politiques, affectant de manière négative les relations interétatiques, en général. La 
recherche des modalités de transformation de la mémoire historique des Ukrainiens et des 
Polonais et d’élimination des confrontations interethniques implique la clarification multiple 
et impartiale de tous les aspects du problème, ainsi que le dépassement des stéréotypes socio-





The history of formation and development of the inter-state relationships 
between Ukraine and Poland is quite controversial by its nature. Since the 
statehood inception Ukraine and the Republic of Poland have been constantly in 
the process of setting up mutual connections, which cannot be defined as being 
stable and neighbourly due to various historical events and factors. However, it 
can be asserted, with confidence, that under no circumstances either the 
Ukrainian or the Polish nation was able to develop separately or independently, 
without complementary influence. 
Ukraine and Poland are closely connected by the common 700-year past, 
during which both peoples have experienced the periods of good-neighbourliness 
and rupture, open enmity and even conflicts. The explanation of it implies 
elucidating some definitely important factors. Firstly, for a long time the two 
nations had been the subordinates to the same states: the First and Second 
Rzeczpospolita, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. Secondly, the Ukrainians 
and Poles were subjected to the violent inter-ethnic confrontation during the 
Second World War. Thirdly, both nations experienced the effects of the “socialism 
construction process”, the complexities of totalitarianism, the crisis of the 
communist regime and its collapse, and then the search for a new model of post-
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communist development.1 All these factors taken together in the context of a 
certain historical epoch united and, at the same time, disunited and confronted 
the Ukrainians and Poles. Common historical heritage has given rise to many 
socio-historical stereotypes and myths, predetermined by the specificity of each 
nation’s historical memory. The historical memory has strongly influenced and 
still keeps influencing the bilateral relations. Under such conditions of historical 
coexistence relationships between Ukrainians and Poles obviously could not be 
balanced and non-conflict. The so-called “cornerstones” of the bilateral relations 
have led to many misunderstandings and even armed conflicts. 
In the time of establishing the independent statehood in Poland and 
Ukraine, the level of patriotism in both countries was quite low. Historical 
memorable places that would have become the basis for the formation of a new 
national identity have been either disregarded or neglected at all. This factual 
absence of the so-called national collective memory can be argued as a 
consequence of the Soviet phase of the two nations’ historical development. 
Therefore, it seems logical that in the national environments of both Ukrainians 
and Poles there has developed a strong, sometimes even hypertrophied, desire to 
elucidate many of the complex and vague issues of the past, largely those that are 
common for both nations. The “Volhynia massacre” appeared to be the most 
complicated issue in the bilateral relations, particularly owning to the fact that 
there are still living witnesses of the confrontation between Ukrainians and Poles 
in Volhynia during the Second World War. They live on both sides of the 
Ukrainian-Polish border and each of them has his/her own recollections and 
interpretation of those events. The ability to remember the past is an inherent 
feature of the humans. 
One of the central issues of this study is the role of the historical memory 
in elucidation of the events of the Volhynian tragedy. In accordance with the 
traditional paradigm, we understand the “historical memory” as the ability of 
the human mind to preserve the individual and collective experience of 
interpersonal relationships; on the basis of it is constructed the individual 
understanding of history. In fact, it can be defined as the information available 
for the social identification of the individual and the community. Historical 
memory, both individual and collective, is the result of the interaction of an 
                                                          
1 Л. В. Стрільчук, Україна – Польща: від добросусідських відносин до стратегічного 
партнерства (кінець ХХ – початок ХХІ століття ) [Ukraine – Poland: from good-
neighborly relationships to strategic partnership (late 20th – early 21st Centuries)], 
Луцьк, 2013, с. 9. 
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individual and the social environment. There is no historical memory without 
this interaction. In other words, historical memory is a kind of a human’s 
identification with a certain culture.  
In recent years many historians in the world have become increasingly 
interested in the problems of the historical memory. Among the many 
publications the following are worth mentioning P. Nora2 and A. Kyrydon3, who 
have researched the theoretical aspects of the historical memory formation and 
its components. The works shed light on the events in Volhynia, contributing to a 
better understanding of their place in the domain of the historical memory 
content and providing clues to the social identification of an individual and the 
community. Polish and Ukrainian researchers, especially Eva and Władysław 
Siemaszko, G. Motyka, W. Wiatrowicz, M. Kuczerepa, V. Visyn, I. Pushchuk, 
V. Serhiychuk, B. Hud, Y. Hrytsak, and O. Kalishchuk lay emphasis on manifold 
aspects of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict. The key findings of their studies reveal 
the causes and consequences of those tragic events. 
The goal of this scientific research is the elucidation and balanced scientific 
interpretation of the causes, course, and consequences of the Polish-Ukrainian 
conflict in Volhynia during the Second World War, clarifying the influence of the 
historical events on the historical memory transformation in both Ukrainian and 
Polish societies. It is aimed at reconciliation of both approaches to the 
interpretation and evaluation of those events. True, unbiased coverage of 
historical facts, revealing the uncoordinated moments of the problem, and the 
disclosure of the facts to the general public is one of the ways of positive 
transformation of the historical memory concerning the conflict between Poles 
and Ukrainians in Volhynia, in 1943-1944.  
 
THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
 
In the years of 1943-1944 an unprecedented bloody conflict broke out on 
the territory of Volhynia, which (as a borderland for several centuries) was 
inhabited by Ukrainians and Poles. The long-existing conflict exacerbated greatly 
                                                          
2 П. Нора, Теперішнє, нація, пам’ять [Present, Nation, Remembrance], Київ, 2014, 272 с. 
3 Алла Киридон, «Історична пам’ять» у просторі політики пам’яті ["Historical 
memory" in the space of remembrance policy], in “Історичні та політологічні 
дослідження. Науковий журнал”. Спеціальний випуск: доповіді на міжнародній 
науково-практичній конференції «Трансформації історичної пам’яті», Вінниця, 
2018, с. 45–53 http://jhpr.donnu.edu.ua/article/view/5112  
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in the years of the war, reflecting the tense Ukrainian-Polish relationships of the 
previous decades. A brief historical analysis of the events that preceded that 
bloody conflict may contribute to better understanding of the ethnic 
confrontation between Poles and Ukrainians during the Second World War. 
It is a commonly known fact that before the First World War, Volhynia was 
a part of the Russian Empire like most of the Ukrainian lands. At the end of the 
First World War, the political situation developed in such a way that since 1918 
Volhynia had become the epicentre of the struggle between the two newly-formed 
states: the independent Ukraine and the Second Polish Commonwealth. In fact, the 
struggle for Volhynian land began in 1918, when the legions formed by Józef 
Piłsudski (with the support of the Entente) attacked the young Western Ukrainian 
People's Republic. Like the Western Volhynia and Western Belarus, this territory 
had become a part of the Second Rzeczpospolita.4 The Polish government tried to 
turn Poland into a mono-ethnic state by introducing “polonization”. According to 
the archival documents and memoirs of local residents, the Polish authorities 
confiscated the lands from the Ukrainians and handed them over to the Polish 
settlers.5 Commonly, they were soldiers and the retired officers of the Polish 
Army, as well as civilian volunteers from among Polish immigrants who lived in 
the so-called “crown lands” and received land plots on the territories of Western 
Ukraine (Western Volhynia, Polissia, Eastern Galicia) and Western Belarus during 
the interwar period. Probably, this fact by itself gave rise to the conflict between 
the Ukrainian and Polish population. The policy of “pacification” introduced by the 
Polish government strongly reduced its authority and had aggravated ethnic 
hatred of the indigenous ethnic groups (the Ukrainians) to the Poles. It also 
brought about mass arrests of the Ukrainian population in Volhynia and Galicia, 
violence against civilians, Ukrainian schools and Orthodox churches closure, and 
prohibition of the Ukrainian public-cultural institutions and organizations.6 The 
oldest and most respected (in that region) cultural public organization – 
“Prosvita” – was liquidated. This organization had been a promoter of the national 
                                                          
4 Л. О. Зашкільняк, М. Г. Крикун, Історія Польщі: Від найдавніших часів до наших днів 
[History of Poland: from the ancient times to present], Львів, 2002, с. 451 – 452. 
5 Трагедія українсько-польського протистояння на Волині 1938 – 1944 роки. 
Володимир-Волинський район [The Tragedy of the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in 
Volhynia in 1938 -1944. Volodymyr-Volhyniaskyi district], I. Pushchuk ed., Луцьк, 
2011, с. 113–118. 
6 Л. Стрільчук, В. Стрільчук, Інституційні складові українсько-польських гуманітар-
них взаємин і співробітництва [Institutional components of the Ukrainian-Polish 
humanitarian relationships and cooperation], Луцьк, 2013, с. 10. 
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interests of Ukrainians for more than half a century and carried out its activities 
on the territories of Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. 
The policy of “pacification” facilitated the radicalization of the Ukrainian 
resistance on these lands. The Second World War exacerbated relations between 
Ukrainians and Poles, having deepened pre-war strife and resulted in an inter-
ethnic conflict. Yet, it would not be correct to assume that the Ukrainian-Polish 
confrontation in Volhynia during the war was purely interethnic. It was also 
strongly influenced by the intervention of the third forces: the Soviet partisans7 
(among which there were Ukrainians who supported the Bolshevik ideology), 
the Polish Army Craiova (AK), Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).8 
Each of the parties involved in incitement reinforced hostility between 
Ukrainians and Poles and did it purposely, hoping for political benefits.9 On the 
other hand, it was the civilian population of Volhynia, both Ukrainians and Poles, 
who suffered greatly of that interethnic hostility, some of them falling victim to 
this armed confrontation.  
The above mentioned facts can be considered as powerful factors that 
caused escalation of the confrontation and development of the inter-ethnic 
conflict in Volhynia region in the context of the war. The German occupation 
exacerbated this interethnic dissension and enmity. The conflict between 
Ukrainians and Poles had turned into an armed one. The Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army (UPA) and the Polish Army Craiova appeared to be involved into it. The first 
priority goal of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in Volhynia was to eliminate 
the Polish Government claims on the Volhynian land (once it had happened after 
the First World War)10. In addition, disloyal and opposing to UPA population was 
definitely reliable potential support for Germany and the USSR in implementation 
of their plans. By the beginning of the summer of 1943, UPA forces in Volhynia, 
according to various sources, numbered from 3 to 5 thousand fighters, and by the 
                                                          
7 О. Каліщук, У тіні Волині? Історія vs пам’ять [In the Shadow of Volhynia? History vs. 
Memory], Луцьк, 2016, с. 25–27. 
8 Ibid., p. 64. 
9 G. Motyka, Od Parośli do Borodycy. «Antypolsa akcja» OUN-B i UPA na Wołyniu I w Galicji 
Wschodniej 1943 – 1945 [From Parośli to Borodychy. «Anti-Polish action" OUN-B and 
the UPA in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943 - 1945], in S. Galij-Skarbińska (ed.), 
Wołyń 1943. Pamięć złych czasów i symbol pojednania? [Volhynia 1943. The memory of 
bad times and a symbol of reconciliation?], Toruǹ, 2014, p. 28. 
10 B. Hud, Ukraińcy I Placy na Naddnieprzu, Wołyniu i w Galicji Wschodniej w XIX i pierwszej 
połowie XX weku. [Ukrainians and Poles in Transnistria, Volhynia and Eastern Galicia 
in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries], Warszawa, 2018, p. 280 – 283. 
The Ukrainian-Polish Conflict in Volhynia  151 
end of the year this number had increased to 8-12 thousand.11 The Polish partisan 
detachments in the region numbered 1,300 soldiers, and about 3,600 armed 
persons acted as self-defence bases. The Polish police collaborated with the Nazis 
and participated in the “pacification” of the Ukrainian villages. The police units 
numbered about 2,000 policemen. The 202nd battalion of the Polish 
“pomegranate” police arrived from the General Governorate, numbering 360 
people to support them.12 Dozens of nationally conscious Ukrainians of Podlaskie, 
Chełmszczyzna, Sian region and Łemkowszczyzna, who stood for the Ukrainian 
state revival, were decimated by the Poles in the first three months of 1943. As a 
matter of fact, it had happened before the bloody events in Volhynia started. Some 
of the illustrative facts of the case study are worth mentioning in this regard. On 
March 1, the representatives of Polish population killed a well-known Ukrainian 
leader Colonel Jakhov Voinarovskyi in Hrubieszów; on March, 19, the head of the 
local Support to Ukraine Committee, Mykola Strutynskyi was murdered, and on 
March 20 and 29, his assistants: Mikhail Novosad and Timofii Stakhurskyi.13 This 
list can be continued. 
At that stage of the relationships exacerbation, Volhyniaians had not been 
involved into the bloody armed conflict of Ukrainian autochthons and Polish 
colonists. In their appeal to the Ukrainians of the Hrubieszów district on April 25, 
1943, the Polish Underground claimed: “We recognize the Germans to be our 
common enemy, who, to satisfy their own goals, opposed Ukrainians against Poles 
in one neighbourhood, and the Poles against the Ukrainians in the other, and 
amuse themselves rejoicing the armed confrontation”. However, further we read: 
“Poland has always been here and will be. Ukraine has been and will be, but not 
on the land of Hrubieszów, because Ukrainians has never been masters there and 
will not ever be. Do not touch the lands of the Hrubieszów. It will not be either 
German or Ukrainian, but only Polish, and we will defend it until the last drop of 
                                                          
11 В. В'ятрович, Друга польсько-українська війна [The Second Polish-Ukrainian War], 
Київ, 2011, 288 c. 
12 Ibid., p. 128-131. 
13 В. Сергійчук, Польсько-українське протистояння на Волині у роки Другої світової 
війни: причини, перебіг і наслідки.[Polish-Ukrainian Confrontation in Volhynia during 
the Second World War: Causes, Evolution and Consequencies], in У пошуках правди: 
36. Матеріалів міжнар. наук. конф. «Українсько- польський конфлікт на Волині в 
роки Другої світової війни: генезис, характер, перебіг і наслідки [Ukrainian-Polish 
Conflict in Volhynia during the Second World War: Genesis, Principal Features of the 
War, the Evolution and Consequencies], Луцьк, 2003, с. 162–191. 
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blood”.14 Moreover, the Ukrainians were warned and threatened: per each Polish 
village deported with the participation of the Ukrainian police, two Ukrainian 
villages will be burned down, and per each Pole killed by Ukrainians, two 
Ukrainians will be killed.15 These threats were quick to come true. On May 6, 1943, 
Polish gangs killed 6 peasants in Molakhov, 26 inhabitants of Striltsiv, and 4 – in 
Tuhan. Many patriotic-minded Ukrainians of the Hrubieszów region became 
victims of an outright terror on May 29.16 
In April-October 1943, new victims from among the Ukrainians in 
Chełmszczyzna perished of the Polish attacks. Thus, on October 31, 1943, in 
Hrubieszów there was a memorial burial service to hundreds of peaceful 
Ukrainians who were murdered. The Ukrainian Central Committee made a 
statement in connection with these bloody events: “We do not want war with 
Poland. We did not conceive it. We argue that the Poles, being not provoked in any 
way by the Ukrainians, launched an imprudent attack on them. In Lublin and 
Krakow districts hundreds of Ukrainians perished of the attacks of the Polish 
terrorists, among them the heads and officials of the Ukrainian committees, the 
men of trust, teachers, priests, solicitors, policemen… In general, all the prominent 
authoritative citizens fall, and they fall from Polish bullets. Our people are being 
shot for many months, though we have not initiated that strife. Organized and 
tolerant Ukrainian citizenship has never allowed anyone to profit on such matters 
and we will neither allow nor accept expansion of anti-Polish moods, because we 
do not want a war with the Poles”.17 However, the repressive actions against 
Ukrainians in this region continued. 
Indeed, we cannot ignore the fact that during the Nazi occupation, in the 
absence of legitimate power (either Polish or Ukrainian) there were retaliatory 
armed actions on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. The reports of the 
Soviet partisans mentioned that “many Poles voluntarily collaborate with the 
Germans, join the police units, and together with Germans destroy the Ukrainian 
villages, assassinate population, and fight against nationalists”.18 
                                                          
14 Листування з радою Міністрів [Correspondence with the Council of Ministers], in 
Центральний державний архів Вищих органів влади та Управління у м. Києві 
(ЦДАВО Укр.), [Central State Archive of the Highest State Power Bodies and 
Management in Kyiv (TsDAVO of Ukr.)], Ф. 3959, оп. 2, спр. 48, арк. 81. 
15 Листування з радою Міністрів…, Ф. 3959, оп. 2, спр. 48, арк. 112. 
16 В. Сергійчук, Польсько-українське протистояння…, c. 164. 
17 Листи та звіти по Українській РСР [Letters and Reports on the Ukrainian SSR], 
ЦДАВО Укр., Ф. 3833, оп. 1, спр. 136, арк. 1-3. 
18 В. Сергійчук, Польсько-українське протистояння…, c. 165. 
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A careful study of the documents gives ground to argue that the armed 
conflict between the two peoples happened on the territory of Volhynia owning 
to the fact that the armed actions of the Ukrainians against the German invaders 
started just here, and the occupants managed to quarrel Ukrainians with Poles in 
Volhynia after the Ukrainian police units (under the orders of the OUN organi-
zation) were obliged to struggle against existing regime in the underground and 
joined the UPA ranks.  
In April of 1943, the Nazis and Poles burned down 5 villages: Kostiukhnivka, 
Vovchits, Yablunka, Dovzhitsa and Zagorivka. And this is the result of only one 
action on the territory of the Lutsk district. At the same time, the Germans and the 
Polish “Shuts” Police attacked twice the Krasnyi Sad colony in Horokhivskyi 
District, where 22 farms were destroyed and about a hundred of people were shot. 
In order to provoke the Nazis to anti-Ukrainian actions, the Polish policemen 
threw “compromat” into each hut – purposely put weapons and grenades into 
ovens, bunches of straw or some other places. Thus, in consequence of the Polish 
provocation acts the Germans committed the criminal massacre in several 
Ukrainian villages on the territory of the Horokhivskyi district. On April 10, the 
inhabitants of Kniazhnyi were subjected to the most violent attack: 40 households 
were burned down and 172 people were killed. The occupants slaughtered the 
whole families using the lists compiled by the Poles.19 
The Volhynia district delegate to the Government of the Republic of Poland 
in his appeal of July 28, 1943 clearly described the “true face” of the Polish 
population defenders in the western regions of Ukraine: “The Bolsheviks come to 
the Polish villages, offer their assistance in self-defence and in return, recruit 
Polish youths into their partisan detachments. If they fail in it, they sow panic 
among the population, rob the Polish defenders of weapons and kidnap people, 
then quietly escape to the forest. In a couple of days they can be seen at the head 
of the gangs that attack the same Polish population”.20 
It happened so that during the Soviet era the very fact of the Ukrainian-
Polish conflict was suppressed and disregarded. In the period of 90s of the 
twentieth century – early 21st century, the majority of historians, both Polish and 
Ukrainian, laid emphasis only on the losses of the Polish population. The issue of 
calculating the losses of the Ukrainian population of that time was not considered 
at all. The first study of the number of victims from the Polish side was carried out 
                                                          
19 Ibid., p. 168. 
20 Ibid., p. 174. 
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by the Polish scientists Eva and Władysław Siemaszko21, but scientists in Ukraine 
began to elucidate this problem a little bit later. In fact, only in the last decade the 
problem of calculating the number of the Ukrainian victims of this interethnic 
conflict has become a hotly debated issue. 
The complexity of the calculation is caused by the fact that some of the 
archival documents were destroyed during the Soviet regime period, and it is 
quite clear that during the Second World War no calculations were conducted. In 
addition, a rather long period of time (75 years) separating us from the events 
under question minimizes the survey data of the witnesses and participants of 
those events. The local regional studies and church metrical books partly provide 
an opportunity to count the number of Ukrainian victims of the conflict, and even 
these incomplete calculations confirm that the number of victims of the conflict 
on the Ukrainian side is measured by dozens of thousands. 
It is important to emphasize that it is really hard to admit the truth of 
underlying causes of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict without each researcher’s 
awareness of the fact that Volhynia is the Ukrainian land, and the Ukrainians have 
always lived in the majority here, and they definitely had the right to struggle for 
the revival of their own state during the Second World War. The recognition of 
this fact could help historians to comprehend those events as a historical rationale 
and therefore accept its consequences as a historical regularity. Unfortunately, 
modern Polish politicians and some of historians refuse to recognize the existence 
of a mass Ukrainian national liberation movement in Volhynia in the specified 
period, in particular prof. Władysław Filar22. They try to classify it as “a bandit 
                                                          
21 W. Siemaszko, E. Siemaszko, Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na 
ludności polskiej Wołynia. 1939 – 1945. [Genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists 
on the Polish population of Volhynia. 1939 - 1945], Warszawa, Wydawnictwo "Von 
Borowiecky" T. 1-2, 2000-2008, 1460 s. 
22 See: Władysław Filar, Eksterminacja ludności polskiej na Wołyniu w drugiej wojnie 
światowej [Extermination of the Polish population in Volhynia in the Second World 
War], Warszawa, Światowy Związek Żołnierzy Armii Krajowej, 1999, 149 s.; Idem, 
Działania UPA przeciwko Polakom na Wołyniu i w Galicji Wschodniej w latach 1943–
1944. Podobieństwa i różnice [UPA activities against Poles in Volhynia and Eastern 
Galicia in 1943-1944. Similarities and differences], in Grzegorz Motyka, Dariusz 
Libionka (eds.), Antypolska akcja OUN-UPA 1943-1944. Fakty i interpretacje, Warszawa, 
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2002, s. 41-58; Idem, Wołyń 1939-1944. Eksterminacja czy 
walki polsko-ukraińskie [Volhynia 1939-1944. Extermination or Polish-Ukrainian 
fights], Toruń, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2003, 467 s.; Idem, Wołyń 1939-1944. 
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movement”. This is a path to a deadlock, from which there is no way out. The 
communist ideologists, who described the activities of the “Polish Army Craiova” 
in this way, have already experienced the invalidity of such an approach. 
 
CONTRADICTIONS IN CALCULATING THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS  
OF THE CONFLICT IN VOLHYNIA (1943 – 1944) 
 
As it was mentioned above, today’s Ukrainian historians are faced with the 
hotly debate on the number of victims in Volhynia in 1943-1944. In my opinion, 
the exact number of victims of the conflict cannot be absolutely determined> most 
likely it will be an approximate figure rounded up to tens of thousands on both 
sides. Polish and Ukrainian calculations are mainly based on pre-war census 
figures, and such data are far from perfect for several reasons. Firstly, the census 
was conducted not on the eve of the war, but several years before it, and 
consequently, the figures had changed, especially during the years 1939-1941, the 
period of the so-called “Soviet occupation”. It is not a secret that the Soviet 
authorities carried out repressions, arrests, deportations of the civilian 
population to Siberia. Secondly, during the years of the war there was a large-scale 
migration of people: some left their homes escaping from military actions, some 
were killed during those hostilities, many were deported from the territory for the 
forced labour to Germany, etc. Thirdly, at the beginning of the Polish-Ukrainian 
confrontation, many Polish families left Volhynia voluntarily to save themselves. 
Therefore, we can talk about the number of victims only as approximated to the 
real possible. 
There is every reason to assert that the Polish side operates with extremely 
inflated figures of victims from the Polish side of conflict. This is especially the 
point of view of Eva and Władysław Siemaszko, who claim that the number of 
Polish victims in the Volhynia Voivodeship is about of 60,00023 (herewith 
acknowledging that it is quite an approximation) and Grzegorz Motyka24, who 
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announced 100,000 Polish victims on the territory of Volhynia, Eastern Galicia 
and Chełmszczyzna. Ukrainian historians and experts on region studies argue that 
the number of victims from the Ukrainian and Polish sides altogether range from 
30 to 40 thousand people on each side. 
In order to illustrate the exaggeration of the victim number of the conflict in 
Volhynia during the years of war, it is appropriate to mention some concrete real 
historical facts. The author of the article has carried out a partial inventory of the 
burial places of the conflict victims on the territory of the present-day Volhynia 
region. Thus, the Polish village of Dominopol, on the border between the modern 
Volodymyr-Volhynskyi and Turiisk districts of the Volhynia region, ceased to exist 
in 1943. It was burned down by the Ukrainian partisans as a revenge for the 
support of German punitive actions. As a matter of fact, according to the census 
made by the Germans in 1940, there were 54 estates in Dominopol, 45 of which 
were Polish and 9 were Ukrainian, and only 180 people lived in the village. 
Siemaszko25 considers that in 1943 “250 people of the village were killed, 
probably Poles were in majority”. The Ukrainian researcher I. Pushchuk, refering 
to a number of Polish sources, cites a number of 160 people. Nevertheless, on the 
site of the burned village there is a cross erected by the Poles, the inscription on 
which reads: “To 490 Poles, inhabitants of Dominopol, who died in 1943. Eternal 
Memory to You! The Compatriots”. The number of the possible victims is almost 
doubled. Moreover, the cross has been erected without any permissive documents 
from the Ukrainian authorities, arbitrarily, and therefore illegally. 
Another example is Okhnivka, the village on the territory of modern 
Volodymyr-Volhyniaskyi district of the Volhynia region. Ukrainians lived in this 
village in the vast majority in the war time. According to the census of the 
population and the church metrical books there also lived three Polish families (8 
persons). There is evidence that one of the Polish families left the village in 1939. 
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We cannot deny that there was an assassination of the Poles by Ukrainians in this 
village. It is a confirmed fact, indeed, but another fact strikes. When entering the 
village, you can see a memorial sign similar to the Dominopol cross, on which it is 
inscribed, that in the village of Okhnivka, 168 Poles perished “of the hands of 
Ukrainians” (in other words, they were killed by the Ukrainians). Unfortunately, 
there are no documents or evidence that could confirm the acceptability of this 
number. By the way, as in the first case, the local authorities did not give any 
permission to erect the cross, so it was installed arbitrarily, and accordingly, the 
figures on it do not have any certainty or credibility. In this case the number of 
victims is exaggerated at least 20 times. 
We can offer dozens of such and similar examples, and they themselves 
testify to the far-fetched and obvious exaggeration of the figures of the victims of 
the conflict, at least from the Polish side. On the other hand, in Volhynia there are 
many villages, such as Krasnyi Sad of Horokhivskyi District, Honchyi Brid of Kovel 
District, Stenzharychi of Volodymyr-Volhynianskyi District, which were 
destroyed by the Poles, burned down, and all their inhabitants were killed. The 
historical memory does not recognize the one-sidedness in the elucidation and 
interpretation of the facts. Speculation on the tragic pages of history does not add 
credibility and reconciliation to either of the sides. 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE HISTORICAL MEMORY  
OF THE UKRAINIANS AND POLES 
 
It must be admitted that such a keen interest to the problems of the 
common history of Ukrainians and Poles have arisen only in the recent years. 
The study has revealed that during the last quarter of the century a lot of new 
mutually positive visions and stereotypes of two neighbouring nation attitudes 
to each other have been formed. Contemporary Ukrainians associate Poles with 
economic progress, successful reforms, prosperity, and stability. For the Poles, 
a Ukrainian is a good-natured, diligent immigrant worker, a hospitable and 
friendly neighbour: Ukraine is also a strategic partner. There is a noticeable 
tendency towards constant growth of positive mutual perception of Poles among 
Ukrainians and vice versa. The poll of 2000 in Ukraine showed that the Poles are 
in third place regarding the Ukrainians’ adherence to them26. In the period of 
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2001-2010 the number of those who perceive the Republic of Poland as a good 
neighbour has increased greatly in Ukraine; the typical Pole is perceived as a 
religious person and, at the same time, an enterprising one. It is evidenced by 
the results of a nationwide survey “The Perception of Poland and Poles in 
Ukraine”.27 Overcoming negative stereotypes in relation to each other and the 
formation of new, more positive in the minds of neighbouring peoples is an 
important component of the harmonious development of human relations28. The 
institutional components of this type of interaction are quite diverse and 
multifaceted, and it is this fact that contributes to the spiritual convergence of 
Ukrainians and Poles and promotes integration of the two cultures. 
Modern Ukrainian and Polish societies are experiencing a period of 
historical memory transformation, and the remembrance and reconsideration of 
the inter-ethnic Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Volhynia during the Second World 
War is an important element of it. Unfortunately, both societies have not yet 
managed to overcome and reject all the negative stereotypes. The main reasons 
for this, in our opinion, are the following: 
- it is rather difficult to reverse deep-rooted prejudice syndrome in the 
minds of the older generation; it may take a long time, sometimes even generation 
change; 
- the lack of economic and cultural attractiveness of Ukraine for Poland. The 
Republic of Poland has never considered Ukraine as a financial or technological 
partner; all the hopes and expectations of Poland for cooperation are definitely 
associated with the West; 
- for the Polish society, the vast majority of which professes Catholicism, 
Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism, the spiritual religious situation in Ukraine is 
alien and incomprehensible, and therefore the religious factor influences the 
public consciousness sufficiently; 
- the issues of the common Ukrainian-Polish history have been in the focus 
of the political statements of the Polish political elite in the period from 2013 to 
2016. Those claims exacerbated the historical accents of the Polish society on the 
conflict moments of the past and the events of the Second World War in Volhynia, 
in particular. 
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Let us consider the last item in detail to illustrate the problems of historical 
memory modern transformation. It becomes even more important in the context 
of the most recent statements made by the Polish political elite that caused great 
changes in the public opinion of the Poles concerning their eastern neighbours: 
the Ukrainians.  
July of 2016 will enter the history of the Ukrainian-Polish remembrance 
discourse as a dividing line of disagreement, having nullified the achievements of 
the quarter-of-a-century dialogue of the intellectuals and political elite of the two 
countries. On July 22, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland voted for the resolution 
“On Determining July 11 the Day of Remembrance of the Poles, Victims of the 
Genocide Committed by the OUN-UPA”. The Sejm’s decision made the Ukrainian 
historians accept their defeat in the bilateral dialogue. As Yaroslav Hrytsak stated 
in his interview with one of the Internet publications: “I have to admit: it is too 
late to lock the stable-door when the horse has been stolen; and we have lost the 
«horse». I consider it a personal defeat and I am ready to take responsibility, but I 
am not going to give up. We lost the battle, not war. And this war seems to be quite 
long. Therefore, it is better to regroup forces and think of a new attack”.29 The 
same decision of Polish authorities produced a kind of shock for the Ukrainian 
society, especially when we consider the quantitative results of the voting: 442 
deputies voted for the resolution, 0 - against and only 10 deputies abstained. In 
fact, all the previous developments and progress in the domain of harmonization 
and interpretation of the common history appeared to be in vain. It concerns, first 
of all, the long-term dialogue of scientists on the issues of harmonization of the 
views on the common history. There were several significant events promoting 
this process: the joint statement of the presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of 
Poland “To Mutual Understanding and Unity” of May 21, 1997, opening of the 
memorial to the Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation in the Volhyniaian village 
Pavlivka in 2003, where the Presidents of both countries, L. Kuchma and 
A. Kwaśniewski were present; the elaboration of a common position concerning 
the creation of the “Eaglets' Memorial” in Lviv and later, on June 24, 2005 opening 
the memorial to the soldiers of the Ukrainian Galician Army, who perished in the 
battles for Lviv. The opening ceremony of “Eaglets Memorial” at the Lychakiv 
cemetery was attended by the presidents V. Yushchenko and A. Kwaśniewski. 
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Another event worth mentioning is opening of the Monument-Memorial to the 
Ukrainians in the village of Pawlokoma in the Republic of Poland on May, 13 2016 
(with the participation of the presidents V. Yushchenko and L. Kaczyński). On 
February 28, 2009 the Presidents of Ukraine and Poland took part in the 
ceremony of commemorating the victims of the inter-nation confrontation in the 
years of the Second World War at Guta Peniatska (Ukraine). 
The Republic of Poland has not only always been a neighbourly state, a 
trade partner for Ukraine in the post-Soviet period, but also has become a 
strategic partner. It means deepening and expanding interstate cooperation in 
the political, economic and humanitarian spheres.30 However, the human sphere 
and historical memory as its integral part appeared to be the most problematic 
and hotly debated issues in recent years. We provide a few examples to illustrate 
this statement. 
1. Sharp aggravation of the issues of historical memory, their 
transformation toward the formation of negative socio-historical stereotypes is 
evidenced by the so-called “wars on the graves”, e. i. plundering places of national 
memory. The chronology of the last three years is a vivid illustration to this: 
Year 2014: April of 2014 – at the Greek Catholic Cemetery a monument to 
the Ukrainian community of the village of Mołodycz of the Jarosław county of 
Podkarpackie voivodeship was destroyed; March of 2014 – the symbolic grave of 
the UPA soldiers was desecrated in Hruszowice of the Przemyśl county of the 
Podkarpackie Voivodeship; May 2014 – a repeated act of vandalism in 
Hruszowice; July 2, 2014 – at Wierzbica of the Tomaszów Lubelski County of the 
Lublin Voivodeship a memorial commemorating the Ukrainian victims of the 
communist repressions was damaged. 
Year 2015: a commemorative sign for the UPA soldiers on the mountain 
Monastyr near the village Werchrata of Lubaczów County in Podkarpackie 
Voivodeship was profaned; a commemorative sign for the dead Ukrainians in the 
village Radruż, Lubaczów County of Podkarpackie Voivodeship was damaged; a 
commemorative sign to the UPA soldiers in the village Białystok Hrubieszów 
County Lublin Voivodeship was profaned; May 27, 2015 – a memorable sign on 
the symbolic grave of UPA soldiers in Hruszowice Podkarpackie Voivodeship was 
damaged. 
Year 2016: March 5, 2016 – a monument to the Ukrainian community in 
the village Mołodycz of the Jarosław county of Podkarpackie Voivodeship was 
partly destroyed; May 15, 2016 – the graves at the Ukrainian military cemetery in 
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the village of Pikulice near Przemysl were plundered; October 9, 2016 – members 
of the ultra-right organization Obóz Wielkie Polski destroyed the monument on a 
mass grave of the UPA soldiers in the village Werchrata of Lubaczów County 
Podkarpackie Voivodeship. 
Year 2017: January 8, 2017 – in the village Huta Pienyatska of the Lviv 
region unknown people destroyed the memorial to the dead Poles erected to 
commemorate the persons who perished during punitive actions in the Second 
World War; March 12, 2017, monuments to the victims of the Ukrainian-Polish 
conflict during the Second World War were painted in red in the village 
Pidkamin in Lviv region; March 14, 2017 - a commemorative memorial to the 
Poles in the village Huta Pienyatska of the Lviv region has been damaged the 
second time this year. 
Acts of vandalism in places of national memory, of course, do not add any 
positive elements to the bilateral inter-nations relations. Their dynamics testifies 
the transformation of historical memory in both societies in the direction of 
exacerbation of contradictions in the interpretation and perception of the 
historical past.31 
2. In autumn of 2016 a scandalous controversial feature film “Wołyń” by 
Wojciech Smarzowski was released on the Polish cinematography market. In this 
context, at least two conclusions can be suggested: the accents aggravation on the 
complex and negative pages of the common history of the recent past; attempts 
unilaterally distort the interpretation of the events of the Second World War in 
Volhynia, in particular the Ukrainian-Polish conflict. 
Question arises: what is it aimed at and who benefits? Decree of the Sejm of 
the Republic of Poland, dated July 22, 2016, and the release of the film “Wołyń” in 
October 2016, the two consecutive and powerful accents made by the Polish 
authorities and artists on the Volhynia events of 1943 – 1944, indicate to the 
aggravation of the problems of historical memory (at least from the Polish side). 
W. Smarzowski’s film ratings, the number of viewers who watched it, and the 
number of nominations that were awarded to it in March 2017 confirm that the 
problem of Ukrainian-Polish confrontation during the Second World War on the 
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territory of Volhynia went far beyond textbooks and has become a general social 
problem in the Republic of Poland. The greatest disappointment is that it 
happened after an agreement seemed to have been reached in this confrontation 
in 2003. Unjustifiably brutal scenes of the film, distortion of the historical facts, of 
course, do not add any positive features to the bilateral interstate relations, but 
more likely incite Polish society, instilling negative historical and social 
stereotypes into relationships with their Eastern neighbours -the Ukrainians. Due 
to the distortion of historical facts, the film “Wołyń” claims to be a leader in the 
nomination “A film that negatively affected interethnic relations”. Nevertheless, 
the film has broken all the records of Poland over the last ten years. Judging from 
the number of viewers who watched it, we have to admit that it made a significant 
impact on the Polish society.32 According to the Polish statistics the consequence 
of the film release in Poland was mass negative perception the Ukrainians’ role in 
the common history and negative attitudes to the state of Ukraine in general. 
3. The assaults on the Ukrainian students in Poland are a vivid illustration 
of such state policy consequence. Not only the Ukrainian students but the 
Ukrainian migrant workers also have become objects of the open aggression. On 
January 17, 2016, local neo-Nazis attacked the workers in the town of Kutno in 
Łódź Voivodeship. The radicals attacked the hostel, shouting the slogans “Poland 
for Poles” and “Ukrainians, Get Out”. Six Ukrainians came into view of the 
attackers. Witnesses say that the Poles broke into the room and crashed 
everything on their way. The attackers were armed with castes, stones and knives. 
Fortunately, the Ukrainians repulsed the attack, and the hooligans were taken to 
the police station.33 These examples are only a small part of a series of similar 
cases. Such precedents become more and more frequent in Krakow, Przemysl, 
Lublin and other Polish cities, especially in the eastern provinces. 
4. The shelling of the Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Lutsk.  It is 
sad to state the fact that the “third force” arranges various provocations to 
exacerbate the confrontation in the Ukrainian-Polish relations. The most 
treacherous was shelling of the Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Lutsk 
from the grenade launchers on the night of March 29, 2017. As the media 
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reported the unidentified people shot the building of the Consulate General of 
the Republic of Poland in Lutsk, and judging by the size of the hole in the roof, 
they could have shot from a grenade launcher or other serious weapons.  The 
head of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin commented on the event: 
“I am confused by the provocation against the Polish Consulate General in 
Lutsk. This is quite a disgraceful action of those who oppose our friendship with 
the Republic of Poland”.34 
The above mentioned examples negatively affect the bilateral Ukrainian-
Polish relations and cast doubt on the achievements of the political and scientific 
elites of the two countries, risking complicating and again exacerbating the inter-
nation confrontations. The transformation of the historical memory of the 
Ukrainian and Polish societies, overcoming negative stereotypes and the 
formation of new and more positive stereotypes in the minds of people, living in 
the neighbouring countries are important components of the harmonious 
development of the inter-state relations between Ukraine and Poland. The 
significance of historical memory in the relations between Ukraine and the 




The centuries-long history of the Ukrainian-Polish relationships is 
saturated with many examples of mutual assistance, friendship and cooperation 
between the two peoples. Insufficiently explored pages of common history 
obstruct improvement and deepening of good-neighbourly relations between the 
two states and peoples. The Polish-Ukrainian confrontation in the 20s and 40s of 
the 20th century left a remarkable impact in the memory of both peoples. 
Ukrainian-Polish strife in the period of the Second World War was the culmination 
of the Ukrainian-Polish conflicts in the 20th century and it is particularly relevant 
to the events known as Volhynia tragedy of 1943-1944. They have caused 
significant social resonance, controversial assessments and interpretations in the 
national and Polish historiographies. Misinterpretations of certain historical facts 
still influence the socio-political life of both states and peoples, impeding the 
harmonious development of good-neighbourly relations between them. Some 
political forces, both in Poland and Ukraine, resort to various speculations, 
distortions, falsifications of events and facts, manipulate with the historical 
memory for the sake of short-term political benefits. Such tendencies have been 
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revealed in the course of preparation for “Volhynia Tragedy” anniversaries (60th, 
70th and 75th anniversaries). The problem of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict has got 
a status of modern challenges that require thoughtful, balanced, reasoned 
responses, adequate in format and content. Moreover, some of them should be 
considered as the threats to the national security of the state. The factors that 
negatively affect the representation and well-balanced scientific interpretation of 
the events of the Second World War should be taken into account, including 
convergence of the approaches to their interpretation and evaluation by 
Ukrainian and Polish societies. Faithfull, unbiased elucidation of the historical 
facts, revealing uncoordinated moments of the problem and disseminating them 
to the general public are one of the ways to facilitate positive transformation of 
historical memory concerning the inter-ethnic conflict between Poles and 
Ukrainians in Volhynia in 1943-1944. It is this way that seems to be the most 
effective and appropriate to smooth the confrontation between the Ukrainians 
and the Poles in their interpretation of the historical past. 
